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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Vol. 69 SUMMER, 1965 No. 4
THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE OF SEARS AND COMPCO:
A PLEA FOR A FEDERAL LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION
BY JOHN R. PETERSON*
Should there be federal legislation to define a law of unfair competition
which would have uniform applicability throughout the nation and provide
remedies consistently enforceable in the federal courts-a law which would
weigh equally in balance with existing laws on patents, trademarks and copy-
rights? This is a question which is stirring the American Patent Law Associa-
tion, the American Bar Association and other associations, as well as indi-
vidual members of the bench and bar directly concerned with unfair
competition, as a result of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions
of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' and Compco Corp. v. Day Brite
Lighting Co.
2
In bold and far-reaching opinions by Justice Black, the Court in these
cases refused to enjoin the copying of unpatentable products, holding that the
state law of unfair competition could not operate to prohibit copying which
was not unlawful under federal patent statutes.3 The Court stated that the
sphere of state law in such cases was limited to the requirement of proper
labeling and other precautionary steps to be taken to prevent customers from
being misled as to the source of the goods.
4
Rooted in basic concepts of equity, the law of unfair competition has
reflected the conscience of the law in refereeing the free competition for the
use and expression of ideas. 5 It has followed the play in this competition,
* Chairman Unfair Competition Committee, American Patent Law Association;
Chairman 1963-1964 Copyright Division, Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Law, Americari Bar Association; Member of Massachusetts and Illinois Bars; formerly
Counsel of Continental Casualty Co., Chicago, and now General Counsel of The First
Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston, Massachusetts, and its various activities, including
The Christian Science Monitor.
1. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
3. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) ; Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
4. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
5. "Like many of the principles of torts, the fundamentals of unfair competition
originated in the sense of justice of the common law judges." 1 NImS, UNFAIR COMpETI-
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standing ready to blow the whistle when equity would cry "foul." It has thus
acted to protect the public and the participants from misrepresentation, mis-
appropriation, free rides, unjust enrichment and other forms of fraud, and to
eliminate the confusion which would otherwise result. 6 Together with the law
of patents, trademarks and copyrights, the law of unfair competition has
sought to balance the product rights of inventors, writers, artists, musicians,
manufacturers and other creators with the rights of competitors in a free
society to copy and utilize ideas which are in the public domain. 7 It has grown
up side by side with the law of patents, trademarks and copyrights in much
the same way as the growth of equity itself paralleled the growth of the
common law, adapting itself to meet the changing needs of society and bring-
ing the assurance of fair play to competition, whether in the arena of business
for profit or in the field of non-profit activities.8
The federal law of unfair competition received a serious set-back in 1938
with the decision of the Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,9 which in effect
put the well-developed federal common law in this field into limbo by requir-
ing the federal courts in diversity cases to look to the laws of the states rather
than to federal precedents.10 Now the Court in Sears and Compco has
apparently dealt a further blow to the law of unfair competition by limiting the
scope of state law remedies and by reserving to the law of patents and copy-
rights an area of judicial and equitable application which had heretofore been
shared with the law of unfair competition."
The Sears and Coinpco cases have been analyzed by numerous commen-
tators with varying conclusions. Some would suggest that the Court has
merely restated with bold realism the existing law in this field; others see
these cases as pointing to the doom of all private remedies under the law of
unfair competition. 12 Regardless of the point of view taken, the controversy
TION AND TRADE-MARKS 2 (4th ed. 1947). See also 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADE-MARKS 30 (2d ed. 1950).
6. See Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1940).
7. See Oppenheim, The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and In-
tellectual Property, 40 TRADEMARK REP. 613 (1950). For a comparative analysis of the
patent, trademark and copyright systems, see Schulman, Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
right, 10 N.Y.L.F. 174 (1964).
8. For unfair competition cases in nonprofit activities, see Purcell v. Summers,
145 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1944) and Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge A.F. &
A.M. v. Most Worshipful Unversal Grand Lodge, A.F. & A.M., 62 Wash. 2d 28, 381
P.2d 130 (1963).
9. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. Id. at 79.
11. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 238 (1964).
12. For example, see Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1178 (1964) (analysis by five authors) ; Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The
Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 80, 85 (1964) ; Note, Unfair Competition
and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 544, 569 (1964) ; 6 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REv. 138, 140 (1964).
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and confusion as to the meaning of the Court's decisions illustrate the necessity
for clarifying legislation.
The historic role of private remedies under the law of unfair competition
should be written into federal legislation which would once again make
available to the federal courts the established precedents of pre-Erie days, and
which would assure a continuing equal partnership of the law of unfair compe-
tition with the law of patents, trademarks and copyrights. The moral con-
science of our society will insist on preserving the equitable remedies of the
law of unfair competition in curbing fraud and deceit in business and other
dealings for such protection creates the environment in which free competition
can flourish.
This article reviews briefly the decisions of the Court in Sears and
Compco and the historical development of the law of unfair competition. Con-
sideration is then given to several possibilities for legislation on unfair
competition at federal and state levels.
Sears AND Compco
Sears and Compco both arose in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.13 There was no indication at the inception of
these cases that they came to grips with issues which would carry them to the
United States Supreme Court and mark them as the first cases in the field of
product simulation to be considered by that Court since the famous "Shredded
Wheat"' 4 decision of 1938.
In Sears, Stiffel had successfully marketed a pole lamp upon which he
had secured design and mechanical patents. Thereafter, Sears put a rubber
stamp copy of this lamp on the market. Stiffel filed suit for patent infringe-
ment and unfair competition. The trial court found Stiffel's patents to be
invalid ;15 nevertheless, it issued an injunction and ordered an accounting of
Sears' profits, finding that Sears' lamp was similar and had already caused
confusion. The court of appeals affirmed, 16 whereupon Sears petitioned for
certiorari.
In Compco, Day-Brite was a manufacturer of commercial lighting fix-
tures upon which a mechanical patent had been refused but a design patent
had been issued. Compco's predecessor 17 thereafter produced and sold a
13. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226 (1964) ; Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
14. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
15. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226 (1964); The district
court's opinion is not reported but for a summary, see the court of appeals' opinion,
Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
16. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
17 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 235 n.1 (1964).
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fixture very similar to that of Day-Brite. Day-Brite filed suit for infringement
of its design patent and for unfair competition. The trial court held the design
patent invalid.1 8 Considering the charge of unfair competition, it found that the
concurrent sale of the two products was likely to confuse and that some con-
fusion had already occurred. It thereupon enjoined Compco and ordered an
accounting. The court of appeals affirmed,19 holding that there was substantial
evidence to support the trial court's finding of the likelihood of confusion. In
this case both parties petitioned for certiorari.
The Court characterized the issue in these cases as "whether a State's
unfair competition law can, consistently with the federal patent laws, impose
liability for or prohibit the copying of an article which is protected by neither
a federal patent nor a copyright. ' 20 The Court found the federal patent system,
created under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, to be the supreme law
of the land in its area. Consequently, it held that a state court could not extend
a patent or provide protection which was unavailable within the framework of
the federal patent system. Speaking through Justice Black, the Court in
Sears stated:
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly,
it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair
competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives
of the federal patent laws. ... To allow a State by use of its law of
unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which repre-
sents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the
State to block off from the public something which federal law has
said belongs to the public .... This would be too great an encroach-
ment on the federal patent system to be tolerated. 21
In delineating the area of regulation permitted to the states, the Court
asserted :
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other pre-
cautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled
as to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their
trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods
so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading
purchasers as to the source of the goods.22
In Compco, the Court struck at the very foundation of the law of unfair
competition in a dictum which seems to deny injunctive relief under state
18. Id. at 235. As in Sears, the district court's opinion is .not reported, but for a
summary, see the court of appeals' opinion, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp.,
311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
19. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
20. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) ; see also Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
21. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964).
22. Id. at 232.
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law even where there is proof of fraud or the intent to "palm off." This is
the language which has been so hotly disputed:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in
some other way, that the design is "nonfunctional" and not essential
to the use of either article, that the configuration of the article copied
may have a "secondary meaning" which identifies the maker to the
trade, or that there may be "confusion" among purchasers as to
which article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant
evidence in applying a State's law requiring such precautions as
labeling; however, and regardless of the copier's motives, neither
these facts nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability
for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.
23
Only Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, contended that the states
should have the power to enjoin "palming off."
24
It is interesting to note that the Court's opinions gave little consideration
to cases in the field of unfair competition, citing only two of its previous
decisions, 25 namely, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,26 commonly referred
to as the "Shredded Wheat" decision, and Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.
27
When certiorari was granted in Sears and Compco, it was hoped that
the Court would redefine the scope of International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press.2 In this case the Court had added misappropriation to misrepre-
sentation as a basis for relief under the law of unfair competition;29 but the
decision had not had the widespread acceptance originally anticipated.30
Not only did the Court fail to discuss this case,3 1 but it cast a deep shadow over
the whole field of unfair competition.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF Sears AND Corpco
Perhaps some of the difficulty of the bench and bar in trying to assess
the meaning of Sears and Compco lies in the difficulty of trying to pin down
the meaning of "unfair competition.
'32
23. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964). (Empha-
sis added.)
24. Id. at 239.
25. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964).
26. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
27. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
28. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
29. Id. at 240-42.
30. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 934
(1964); Developments in the Law--Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 814, 853 (1955) ; Note, The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 64 VA. L. REV.
600, 601 n.6 (1961) ; 1 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 75; see Cheney Bros. v. Doris
Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) for a discussion by Judge Learned Hand of
International News Service.
31. The International News Service case was cited only by the Department of
Justice in its Amicus Curiae brief.
32. Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1936) ; Netterville, Cali-
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The term "unfair competition" is rooted in the concept of honesty or
morality,83 and its meaning over the years has expanded in the context of
increasingly complex competitive relationships, both commercial and non-
commercial, in a rapidly developing economic and cultural society. 34 The
adaptability of these two words and their ability to describe a body of law
aimed at remedying countless competitive inequities have greatly contributed
to the strength of the doctrine of unfair competition.
3
1
The law of unfair competition arose from the need to provide effective
protection against commercial fraud and deception. Some of its earliest appli-
cations are to be found in the common law of England. Southern v. How,36
decided in 1618, cities an unreported case of even earlier date in which an
action was brought by a clothier who had gained a good reputation for a
quality product and who had developed a particular identifying mark which he
affixed to his cloth. A rival clothier used the same mark on inferior merchan-
dise for the purpose of "passing off" his goods as those of his rival. It was
found that a cause of action properly would lie on the basis of the defendant's
intentionally deceptive use of his competitor's mark.37
This concept of a law of unfair competition to prohibit the fraud of
"passing off" was further recognized as part of the English common law when
Lord Mansfield, in 1783, stated that ". . . if the defendant had sold a medicine
of his own, under the plaintiff's name or mark, that would be a fraud for
which action would lie."
'38
The same principles of unfair competition were early woven into the
fabric of American jurisprudence. In 1844, Justice Story, sitting with the
Circuit Court for Massachusetts, granted an injunction in Taylor v. Car-
penter39 against a defendant who had copied the name "Taylor's Persian
Thread" and the identifying marks found on the plaintiff's spools of thread.
fornia Law of Unfair Competition: Unprivileged Imitation, 28 So. CAL. L. REV. 204
(1955).
33. See note 5 supra.
34. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act, 38 Trade-
mark Rep. 259 (1948).
35. 1 NiMs, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1.
The term is truly illustrative of the relationship between words and ideas so vividly
described by Justice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918) :
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanging, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and context according to the
circumstances -and time in which it is used.
Id. at 425.
36. Southern v. How, Popham 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1618). For discussion of
the history of unfair competition, see 1 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 4: 1 NMas, op.
cit. supra note 5, § 2; SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRADE-MARK LAW
(1925).
37. Id. at 144, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1244.
38. Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293, 99 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1783).
39. 3 Story 458 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844).
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This doctrine of "passing off" was again 4pplied in Howard v. Henriques,40
which protected the use of a hotel name.4 1 In 1877, the Court, in the leading
case of McLean v. Fleming,42 reviewed over forty English and American
precedents. It summarized the basic principle of unfair competition in these
cases: "Equity gives relief in such a case, upon the ground that one man is
not allowed to offer his goods for sale, representing them to be the manufac-
ture of another trader in the same commodity.
'43
At the close of the nineteenth century when the United States was
emerging into a period of great technological advancement, the Court decided
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.44 Singer sought to stop June from using
the name and design of its sewing machine after the expiration of its patent.
The Court, in a pronouncement presaging Sears, characterized the issue as
primarily a question of the duration and termination of monopoly protection
under the patent laws.
45
The Court held that June could use the basic Singer design, as well as
the name "Singer" which had acquired generic significance. It ordered,
however, that June be enjoined from using the name "Singer" on its machine
or in its advertising without clearly and unmistakably identifying itself as
the manufacturer.
40
Following the Singer case, federal courts moved to develop a body of
decisional law on unfair competition which struck a balance between the
concept of the free use of that which is in the public domain and the equally
important concept of commercial morality. The courts distinguished between
functional and nonfunctional design features, enjoining only the copying of
nonfunctional features of an article which had developed a "secondary mean-
ing."'47 A design was considered to have a "secondary meaning" if it had come
40. 3 Sandf. 725 (N.Y. 1851).
41. Every man may and ought to be permitted to pursue a lawful calling in his
own way, provided he does not encroach upon the rights of his neighbor or the
public good. But he must not, by any deceitful or other practice, impose upon the
public; and he must not, by dressing himself in another man's garments, and by
assuming another man's name, endeavor to deprive that man of his own individ-
uality, and thus despoil him of the gains to which by his industry and skill he is
fairly entitled.
Id. at 727.
42. 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
43. Id. at 251.
44. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
45. It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by
it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent
becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.
Id. at 185.
46. Ibid.
47. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917)
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) ; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 742 (1938) ; Note, Unfair Competition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 544 (1964).
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to be identified in the public's mind as originating from a given source. Since
a copier could alter the decorative or nonfunctional features of a product
without impairing his ability to compete, the courts found that misrepresenta-
tion with respect to nonfunctional features having "secondary meaning" did
not have to be, and should not be, condoned.48
In 1938, the Court handed down the "Shredded Wheat" decision.4 9
Speaking through Justice Brandeis, the Court weighed in balance the right
under federal patent law to copy a product which is not patented with the
desire to protect against "passing off" as manifested in the law of unfair
competition. In this case the plaintiff's predecessor had acquired a mechanical
patent on the process for making "Shredded Wheat" cereal and a design
patent on the pillow-shaped form of the biscuit. Upon the expiration of the
mechanical patent and invalidation of the design patent, Kellogg began pro-
ducing the same shaped biscuit, also calling it "Shredded Wheat." The Court
refused to enjoin Kellogg from making the product and using the generic
name "Shredded Wheat," applying the Singer rationale. As in Singer, the
Court emphasized the need for properly identifying the source of the product
"lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff."50 The Court, however, found no
evidence of "passing off" or deception on the part of Kellogg; instead it found
that Kellogg had taken steps to avoid such deception. No "secondary meaning"
which would identify the design of the product with the plaintiff, as distin-
guished from the product itself, was established.5 '
In this same year the American Law Institute published the results of a
comprehensive review of the law of unfair competition in Volume III of the
Restatement of Torts.5 2 Section 711 of this Restatement sets forth the
"General Principle" of the law as follows:
One who (a) fraudulently markets his goods or services as those of
another, or (b) infringes another's trademark or trade name, or (c)
markets goods with an unprivileged imitation of the physical appear-
ance of another's goods is liable to the other for the relief appropriate
S.. [injunction, damages, profits], except to the extent that the other
has by his own conduct disabled himself from claiming such relief.
5 3
48. Handler, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong, 64 COLUm. L. REV. 1187
(1964).
49. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
50. Id. at 119.
51. Id. at 118.
52. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 711-56 (1938).
53. Id. at 542. The Restatement lists in the Introductory Note to Ch. 35 the
following "important factors" as guides in determining what are "unfair trade practices."
(1) whether the practice involves fraud, deception or oppression; (2)
whether it involves a violation of a criminal or penal legislative enactment; (3)
whether it involves conduct which subjects the actor to some other tort liability;
(4) whether it is part of a scheme which involves other practices deemed unfair;
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In a 1963 report the Institute noted that the emphasis in later court
decisions has shifted from the protection of property rights to the granting of
relief from unfairness which might adversely affect others.5 4 This shift no
doubt reflects a desire by the courts to foster competition, but to do so within
the framework of a constantly developing code of commercial ethics.
55
THE EFFECT OF Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
Prior to 1938, the law of unfair competition had been in a state of con-
tinuous and uniform development in the federal courts.56 Under the governing
rule of Swift v. Tyson,57 the federal courts in diversity cases were not bound
to look to state decisional law, but were free to develop their own body of
federal common law on the subject. Because the lack of uniformity in state
court decisions presented a serious impediment to obtaining consistent relief,
many plaintiffs with multi-state business enterprises filed suit in the federal
courts. The existence of a federal common law of unfair competition assured
them of uniform treatment. As a result of this preference for federal remedies,
the federal common law grew and developed, while many of the states lacked
sufficient opportunity to evolve their own progressive common law.
5 8
In 1938, however, the Court overruled Swift v. Tyson in the landmark
case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.5 9 The Court held that a federal court in diversity
cases must apply the law of the state in which it sits. 60 The effect of this
decision was to nullify the whole body of well-reasoned federal common law
on unfair competition. Erie required the federal courts to look to state laws
which in many instances were sparse and archaic and which reflected no
consistent pattern of development. The result of Erie, in the field of unfair
(5) whether it is employed for the purpose of injuring another, or of destroying
competition with the actor; (6) whether it is useful in promoting effective com-
petition in business; (7) the extent to which it departs from accepted standards
of commercial morality; (8) the extent to which it threatens harm to others;
(9) the extent to which its utility or disutility can be appraised by courts and its
use policed through the medium of a civil action; (10) the extent to which public
agencies other than courts may deal with it.
Id. at 540.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, Introductory Note to Ch. 35 at 11 (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1963).
55. Id. at ix.
56. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade
of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1957) ; Note,
The Choice of Law in Multistate Unfair Competition: A Legal-Industrial Enigma, 60
HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (1947) ; Note, Misrepresentation and the Lindsay Bill: A-Stab
at Uniformity in the Law of Unfair Competition, 70 YALE L.J. 406, 421 (1961).
57. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
58. Lundsford, Unfair Competition: Uniform State Act Needed, 44 VA. L. REv.
583, 598 (1958).
59. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
60. Id. at 79-80. The Supreme Court specifically made Erie applicable in unfair
competition cases in Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942).
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competition, has been a bewildering hodgepodge of conflicting decisions which
defies harmonization into a uniform national body of law.6 '
Examples of this chaotic condition are seen in instances of contrary
decisions being rendered on almost identical facts. One such pair of cases is
Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, Inc. 62 and Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Manners Jewelers, Inc.653 In the Haeger case, the defendant's product was an
identical copy of plaintiff's pottery ash tray, with the exception that in place
of plaintiff's name the defendant used its own. In the Zippo case, the product
was a cigarette lighter, which also was identical except for the substitution of
the defendant's name on the bottom. In Haeger, a federal district court in
California, applying California law, granted an injunction against the copying
of the ash tray.64 In Zippo, because of differences in the state law, a federal
district court in Louisiana refused to enjoin the copying of Zippo's lighter.65
Although Erie R.R. v. Tompkins accomplished its purpose of establish-
ing conformity between the decisions of a state court and a federal court sitting
in the same state, the price of such conformity has been a far more important
loss of uniformity in the decisions of federal courts sitting in the several states,
and a severe setback to the law of unfair competition.66
As the unfair competition bar struggled to extricate itself from the
problems created by Erie, Sears and Compco further encumbered the law of
unfair competition in its traditional role of providing equitable remedies for
fraud and deceit in competition. The problem of Sears and Compco is not with
the rulings as applied to the facts in those cases but with the broad and un-
qualified language used by the Court in concluding, without considering the
different objectives of the two branches of the law, that the law of unfair
competition must yield to the law of patents and copyrights.
The law of unfair competition and the law of patents and copyrights are
an essential part of the whole fabric of the law governing human conduct.
Each has been shaped by the conditions which gave rise to its development,
and each has assumed a distinctive pattern of procedure and purpose under
the impact of changing times. The objectives of each, while complementary,
are clearly different.67
61. Diamond, The Proposed Federal Unfair Commercial Activities Act, 23 OHIO
ST. L.J. 110, 112 (1962).
62. 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
63. 180 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1960).
64. Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, Inc., 123 F. Supp. at 271.
65. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Manners Jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. at 848. For other
examples of conflicting decisions see the hearings on H.R. 4651 before the Subcom-
mittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-23 (1964) (statement by Sidney A. Diamond).
66. Id. at 23.
67. Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protections Afforded by Patent, Trademark,
Copyright and Unfair Competition Law: The Sources and Nature of Product Simula-
tion Law, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 413.
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Patent law is an outgrowth of the recognition that the exclusive right,
for a limited time, to the products of one's own creative and inventive genius
fosters creativity and invention and enriches our society. 68 While a patent has
the indicia of a limited monopoly, it is a monopoly created in the public
interest.69 It is necessary, therefore, that it be clearly distinguished from those
monopolies which historically have been considered contrary to the best
interests of a free competitive society.
The early common law did not favor monopolies, reasoning that what was
placed in the public domain should be free for all to use.70 Subsequent abuses
of exclusive grants from the Crown for the production and sale of articles of
trade resulted in the passage of the Statute of Monopolies. 71 The historical
development of monopoly in England and in this country has given to the
word an unfavorable implication of restriction and exclusion. 72 The result has
been a tendency to condemn any activity which has the appearance of a
monopoly, regardless of its merits. The stigma of this term has had its impact
in the field of unfair competition. 73 It has been suggested that this mistaken
notion is a significant factor in the retreat from high business ethics.74
Since the law of unfair competition strikes at fraud which has no justifi-
68. See 1 WALKER, PATENTS 57 (2d ed. Deller 1964).
69. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533 (1871) ; United States v.
Dubilier, 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933).
70. 1 WALKER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 22.
71. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, c. 3 (1623). See Arnold, supra note 67, at
416.
72. 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 222 (2d ed. 1950).
Many monopolies play a beneficial role in ordinary daily activities where public health,
safety, benefit or convenience is involved, e.g., banking, transportation, toll bridges, gas,
water, electricity, telegraph and telephones, garbage removal, wharfs and zoning.
73. See Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A.
1964), where the court stated:
In our opinion, trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair
competition, which happen to continue beyond the expiration of a design patent,
do not 'extend' the patent monopoly. They exist independently of it, under
different law and for different reasons. The termination of either has no legal
effect on the continuance of the other.
Id. at 930. In a commentary on this case, Smith, In Vino (Mogen David Brand)
Veritas?, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 581 (1964), it was stated: "Accordingly, it would appear
that the unfair competition law and the federal jurisdiction thereof is concerned primarily
with protection against predatory practices and not 'awards' of monopolies." Id. at 584.
Nor is relief in unfair competition cases by way of injunction granted for unlimited
times. In International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) relief
was granted "until its commercial value as news to the complainant and all of its
members has passed away." Id. at 245. In Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, Inc., 177
F.2d 177, 186 (1st Cir. 1949), the court pointed out that equity decrees are always open
to modification if circumstances change. The relief granted in New York World's Fair
1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 10, 1964), aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1964), was limited to the
duration of the Fair.
74. Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 967
(1962).
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cation, the relief which it grants should always be available.75 Fraudulent copy-
ing has been likened to forgery, and the same moral stricture should apply.76
The law of patents confers no affirmative right to copy a product upon the
expiration of a patent. It only terminates an exclusive right to make and vend
the patented product.77 It certainly cannot be construed as granting a license
to commit fraud. Patent law does not make lawful upon the expiration of a
a patent that which would not have been lawful if the patent had never been
granted. The Lanham Act, under which injunctive relief against certain kinds
of copying can be obtained, is but one example of the fact that the patent law
does not stand isolated in its field, but must be construed in conjunction with
other pertinent laws providing equitable remedies beyond the scope of the
patent statutes. Many jurists and writers agree that the time has come for
the law of unfair competition to be given full federal legislative recognition
and to be acknowledged as an equal and useful partner with the law of patents,
trademarks and copyrights in serving the public good.,
THE PosT-Sears MAZE
The sweeping language of the Court in Sears and Compco has made it
uncertain how these decisions are to be applied in subsequent cases presenting
differing factual situations, and whether they are to be limited to cases of
product simulation or are to be extended to the whole field of unfair compe-
tition. This uncertainty is reflected in recent cases in which the courts have
considered the application of these decisions.
One striking example of the mechanical application of the Sears and
Compco result is Titelock Carpet Strip Co. v. Klasner.79 Here the defendant,
75. The trial court in New York -World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture
Publishers, Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 939, characterized the role of unfair competition in the
following manner:
Cast in its proper environment, we have here a business venture purposed
to gather in the harvest the seeds of which were planted and nurtured by others
at great expense and with consumate skill. The conclusion here reached is not
an onslaught on the currents of competition; it does not impose shackles on the
arteries of enterprise. It simply quarantines business conduct which is abhorrent
to good conscience and the most elementary principles of law and equity.
Id. at 941.
76. Pattishall, supra note 74, at 983.
77. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
where the court states: "We know of no provision of patent law, statutory or other-
wise, that guarantees to anyone an absolute right to copy the subject matter of any
expired patent." Id. at 930.
78. Judge Clark in Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234
F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Judge Medina in American Safety Table v. Schreiber, 269
F.2d 255,'271 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Judge Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Fed-
eral Common Law, Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 87 (1964) ; Derenberg, The Seventeenth
Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, U.S.P.Q., Aug. 10,
1964, pt. II, p. 21.
79. Titelock Carpet Strip Co. v. Klasner, 142 U.S.P.Q. 405 (Cal. Super. Ct. July
24, 1964).
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Klasner, copied the plaintiff's machine in almost every detail. Klasner was a
former employee of the plaintiff and had obtained parts of the machine by
going into the plaintiff's place of business, ostensibly to collect the parts to
sell as scrap. Klasner, by his deception, simply appropriated the benefit of
hundreds of hours of effort which the plaintiff had put into the development of
his machine. The California Superior Court refused to give relief, relying on
Sears. The court declared that it was "without power to do anything to prevent
or restrict copying. The plaintiffs must rely, and rely solely, upon their patents
and the federal law applicable thereto, for any protection against copying."80
Using a more imaginative approach when faced with facts presenting
somewhat similar issues, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found a con-
fidential relationship as a basis for granting relief. In this case, Servo Corp. of
America v. General Elec. Co.,8 protection was sought for a "hot box" detector
and alarm system. The court held:
Because of the confidential relationship which was betrayed by the
Southern this case is distinguishable from Sears .... In that case the
action was grounded upon state law which gave a remedy for
copying resulting in confusion as to the source of manufacture ...
This case, however, is one of unjust enrichment through breach of a
confidential relationship, and the remedy is derived front the court's
power to award general equitable relief.
s2
Another instance in which a federal district court in California mechani-
cally applied Sears and Compco is Duplex Straw Dispenser Co. v. Harold
Leonard & Co. 8 3 Duplex sought to prevent the copying of its straw dispenser,
but the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Citing
Sears, the court remarked that "although copying a device may prompt the
cry of 'foul,' where the originator of the device has not protected same with
a valid patent, the copying thereof is not prohibited by law."' s4 Again, an
80. Ibid.
81. Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. Sept. 30,
1964). See Sceales, Company Liability for Use of an Idea, 69 DIcK. L. REv. 245, 248
(1965).
82. Id. at 724-25. (Emphasis added.) See also Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50
Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615 (July 23, 1964), where the court made this pungent
observation:
Competition is a desideratum in our economic system, but it ceases to serve
an economic good when it becomes unfair. The concept of fair play should not be
shunted aside on the theory that competition in any form serves the general good.
Only fair competition does that. Unfair competition is not competition at all in
the truest sense of the word.
Id. at 412, 200 N.E.2d at 620. E. I. Dupont v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 141
U.S.P.Q. 447 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1964) ; Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 143 U.S.P.Q.
172 (D. Conn. Oct. 14, 1964).
83. Duplex Straw Dispenser Co. v. Harold Leonard & Co., 229 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.
Cal. April 9, 1964).
84. Id. at 404.
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injunction was denied in reliance on Sears in Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV,
Inc.s5 In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a
lower court decision which had granted a television station relief against the
use of the same television programs by a community antenna company. The
community antenna received the programs from a distant television station
and distributed them locally to its subscribers. The trial court had enjoined
this practice relying in part on the International News Service case.8 6 The
Ninth Circuit, in disagreeing, said: "As we read Sears and Cornpco, however,
only actions for copyright infringement or such common-law actions as are
consistent with the primary right of public access to all in the public domain
will lie."87 The court went on to distinguish International News Service on
several grounds. It pointed out that misrepresentation did not exist inasmuch
as Cable Vision did not modify the content of the programs or fail to give
credit to program sources. In addition, the court found no misappropriation.
Relief for KUTV presumably would be available only on the basis of statutory
or common law copyright or through Federal Communications Commission
regulation pursuant to Congressional mandate.8 8
In yet another California decision, Jerrold Stephens Co. v. Alladin
Plastics, Inc.,s 9 a federal district court refused to hear a counterclaim based
on unfair competition, stating:
The decision [sic] of the Supreme Court in the companion cases of
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. . . . settle, as a matter of law, the proposition that
where a party depends upon the Federal Patent Laws, it cannot,
under common law State right or Statutory State right recover for
unfair competition.9"
A case in which a court found a valuable right and held Sears to be
inapplicable is New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture
Publishers, Inc.9 1 Colourpicture attempted to publish photographs and post-
cards of the fair exhibits. Colourpicture had knowledge that the exclusive
right to these pictures had been granted by Fair Corporation to a competitor
of the defendant. The court found that revenues to be derived by Fair Corpora-
85. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. July 15, 1964), cert.
denied, 33 U.S.L. Week 3252 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1965).
86. Id. at 350-355. See the trial court opinion at 211 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. Idaho
1962).
87. Id. at 350. (Italics added.)
88. Id. at 353.
89. Jerrold Stephens Co. v. Alladin Plastics, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 536 (S.D. Cal.
May 18, 1964).
90. Id. at 539.
91. New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc.,
141 U.S.P.Q. 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885
(1964).
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tion from such exclusive licenses were an essential part of its financing, and
that this source of revenue was a valuable right which it could protect. Grant-
ing the injunction, the court said: "This court does not read either [Sears or
Compco] . . .as striking down, or intending to strike down, all state laws of
unfair competition in all cases and for all purposes." 92 On appeal, the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed,93 although a dissent was
filed. The dissent argued that Sears and Conpco were controlling, reasoning
as follows:
... it has been recently held by the Supreme Court of the United
States that when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright,
State law may not forbid others from copying that article. . . . Thus,
if the buildings and exhibits, the designs of which have not been
patented, could themselves have been copied by others, it would
appear that photographic reproductions of these buildings and
exhibits for the purpose of sales cannot be enjoined.
4
In at least two other cases, courts have avoided the result of Sears and
Compco by relying on the Court's dictum that these decisions are not appli-
cable to unpublished works.95 In these cases, the courts applied state law to
determine whether "publication" had occurred. In Edgar H. Wood Associates,
v. Skene,9 6 a firm of architects received protection for its drawings of a
building.97 In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited,
Inc.,98 a New York court found that Sears was not in point, and held that
the practice of receiving and recording materials, including the appropriation
of a network radio announcer's news report, could be enjoined. The court
stated :
It is equally clear that the right of an author or proprietor of an un-
published work to common law protection and the application of
state law of unfair competition in that field remains unaffected by
these decisions or the principles set forth in these opinions.99
92. New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc.,
141 U.S.P.Q. at 942.
93. New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers, Inc.,
21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1964).
94. Id. at 898, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
95. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964).
96. Edgar H. Wood Associates v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1964).
97. A careful reading of these two opinions does not convince us that they
have struck down common law copyright, which protects unpublished material,
in those States which recognize its existence, or deprived such States of the
right to regulate it. There is a distinction between that protection afforded
under State unfair competition laws to the unpatentable article in the public
domain and the protection extended through common law copyright to an
unpublished work.
Id. at 890.
98. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc.
2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
99. Id. at 726, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 812. The court also said:
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Another recent interesting case is Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest
Records, Inc.100 Here the court distinguished Sears on the ground that it
does not prevent state protection against actual appropriation as distinguished
from mere copying. The court enjoined Greatest Records, Inc. from repro-
ducing Capitol's recording of the Beatles, declaring:
Both defendants' motion and their opposition to the plaintiff's motion
for a temporary injunction are based upon the cases of Sears and
Compco. Such reliance is ill-placed, as these cases are not applicable
to the subject matter and devious conduct of defendants which this
court is presently called upon to deal with. . . . Neither of those
learned decisions stands for the proposition that this plaintiff is not
entitled to protection against the unauthorized appropriation, repro-
duction or duplication of the actual performances contained in its
records. 101
A review of these and other post-Sears and Compco cases indicates that
there are a number of areas in the law of unfair competition where the appli-
cation of Sears and Compco is doubtful. In addition to such areas as trade
secrets, common law copyright and misappropriation in which some courts
have not found Sears and Compco to be controlling, two other areas might be
cited as interesting examples of where limits on Sears and Compco have been
recognized by the courts.
One such area is that of trademark registration. The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals recently permitted Mogen David Wine Corporation to
register its wine bottle design as a trademark despite the imminent expiration
of its design patent.'0 2 Although this case was decided only three days after
Sears and Compco, and it is doubtful that the court had an opportunity to
Federal law (U.S. Code, tit. 17, § 2) explicitly states that nothing in the
Copyright Law "shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or
proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent,
and to obtain damages therefor."
Id. at 726. 248 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
100. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.
2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
101. Id. at 880, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56. See also Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v.
United Artists Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 1964) which held that
Sears and Coinpco did not prohibit state relief against unauthorized appropriation. On
appeal however the Appellate Division reversed and granted defendant's motion to
dismiss. 144 U.S.P.Q. 168 (Nov. 19, 1964). The court cited Sears, Coinpco, and the
Cable Vision cases and stated that the law in the republication of motion pictures via
the television medium was in the formative stage. Plaintiff was given leave to amend
its complaint to show the exact basis for its cause of action. In Flexitized, Inc. v.
National Flexitized Corp., 214 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1964) the court, in granting relief for misappropriation, remarked that Sears and
Compco did not bar such relief.
102. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. (Patents)
March 12, 1964).
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consider those decisions in reaching its conclusion, a motion for rehearing
based on a possible conflict with Sears and Compco was denied.103 Another
case in the area of trademark registration is an October 1964 decision by the
Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 10 4 which cites both Sears
and Mogen David. The Board observed that the Supreme Court had not dealt
specifically with the trademark question and hence "did not, in our opinion,
demarcate the areas of patent protection from that of other federal statutory
protection, including the Trademark Act of 1946. '115 The applicant sought to
register the design of its safety helmet as a trademark. The Board, refusing to
withhold registration in reliance on Sears, stated that to hold Sears as
controlling
* . .would, in effect, be ruling that Section 23 of the [Lanham] Act
of 1946 which expressly provides for the registration of configuration
of goods on the supplemental register is unconstitutional. Obviously,
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, an administrative tribunal,
can not presume to pass upon this constitutional question. That is
solely within the province of a constitutional court. 10
The other area is that of unfair competition causes arising in conjunction
with claims under a federal statute. Thus, in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee
Indus., Inc., 07 where in addition to copying there was a violation of the
Lanham Act by reason of a misdescription of the article of trade, the court
refused to dismiss the complaint. It declared:
What the Supreme Court struck down in [Sears and Compco]
is the state protection of mere copying as against the federal con-
stitutional and patent policies. It did not strike down statutory or
judicial protection when such copying is accompanied by any device
running afoul of the prohibition of the Lanham Act .... It must be
obvious that the act cannot and does not impose penalty for mere
copying. It is other offensive commercial practice which it condemns.
. . . The fact is that other conduct has been alleged which has been
held as a matter of pleading to violate the Lanham Act. 0
103. Rehearing denied (June 2, 1964).
104. Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 143 U.S.P.Q.
163 (Patent Office Trademark Trial & Appeal Board Oct. 21, 1964).
105. Id. at 167.
106. Ibid.
107. Mastro Plastic Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. 311 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. April 15, 1964).
108. Id. at 312. In the following cases the plaintiffs were denied the remedy
sought for the reasons noted. The results might well have been the same even prior to
Sears and Compco, yet it is interesting to note that Sears and Conipco were referred
to in each decision. Relief was denied in Piel Mfg. Co., Inc. v. George A. Rolfes Co.,
233 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 2, 1964) (no secondary meaning); Kingsway, Inc.
v. Werner, 233 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 1964) (no secondary meaning); In
re Stonco Elec. Prods. Co., 143 U.S.P.Q. 393 (Trademark Trial & Appeal
Board July 2, 1964) (the design was functional) ; Wolf and Vine, Inc. v. Pioneer Dis-
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LEGISLATIVE POSSIBILITIES
By highlighting the need for effective legislation, Sears and Compco
have given new impetus to efforts to develop a comprehensive law of unfair
competition at both federal and state levels. 10 9 At the federal level considera-
tion has been given to the role of the Federal Trade Commission Act n 0 and
the Lanham Act1 ' in creating a federal law of unfair competition and to the
possibilities of amendments which would clearly establish one or the other
of these legislative acts as the vehicle for a federal law of unfair competition.
Also under consideration is the proposed Lindsay Bill1 2 which would enact
a comprehensive law of unfair competition at the federal level. At the state
level there is interest in a State Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act'
13
which would bring order to the chaotic laws of the states. Interest has also been
expressed in parallel legislation at federal and state levels on the pattern of the
Uniform State Act.
Federal Trade Commission Act
Reviewing current remedial activities, it is appropriate to consider first
whether a federal law of unfair competition has already been established by
existing legislation. The Federal Trade Commission Act," 4 along with the
Clayton Act," 5 was passed by Congress in 1914 in response to difficulties in
play Fixture Co., 142 U.S.P.Q. 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 24, 1964) (no "stimulating
of confusion") ; International Biotical Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 229 F.
Supp. 528 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 1964) (no "palming off"); Aerosol Research Co. v.
Scovill Mfg. Co., 334 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1964) (no bad faith, fraud, or other un-
conscionable conduct).
109. Evidence of the interest of the Bar in dealing with the problems posed by
Sears and Compco and in promoting constructive efforts toward effective remedial
legislation is seen in recent steps taken by the United States Trademark Association
and the American Patent Law Association.
To provide a forum for exchange of information on prospective legislation, the
United States Trademark Association, on September 17, 1964, established a National
Coordinating Committee, expressing the hope that it would "serve to save the time of
numerous individuals in that actions proposed by legislation or by Federal Agencies
could be studied collectively by the participating groups in an effort to reach uniformity
of action and more effective results."
The American Patent Law Association, one of thirty-one organizations participat-
ing in this coordinating activity, has appointed a committee on unfair competition
to study the problems posed by Sears and Compco. Preliminary studies of this APLA
committee support the desirability of non-pre-emptive federal legislation on unfair
competition which would preserve the possibility of concurrent state legislation.
110. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46, 47-58 (1958).
111. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1958).
112. A bill to provide injunctive relief from activities which dilute the distinctive
quality of a trademark or trade name or which otherwise constitute unfair commercial
activities, H.R. 5514, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (Lindsay, N.Y.).
113. Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, August 1964.
114. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46, 47-58 (1958).
115. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1958).
[ Vol. 69
1965] FEDERAL LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 365
the judicial administration of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act." 6 While these
separate amendments to the Sherman Act were aimed at different problems,
they are nonetheless interrelated in that the Federal Trade Commission
enforces certain provisions of the Clayton Act."
7
The purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act was to stop certain
unfair practices "in their incipiency" which, if left unregulated, might violate
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 118 The administration of the act was entrusted
to a newly created administrative agency. Congress hoped that the FTC
would provide the flexibility of administration and the expertise required to
provide effective regulation of the increasingly complex problems of unfair
trade practices." 9 Congress, however, did not vest exclusive jurisdiction in
the FTC for the enforcement of its provisions outlawing unfair competition.
20
The heart of the Federal Trade Commission Act is Section 5 which
makes "unfair methods of competition in commerce" unlawful.' 2' This new
phrase was adopted since it was thought that the common law interpretation
of the term "unfair competition" might prove to be too narrow. 22 Congress
purposely avoided any definition of "unfair methods of competition," leaving
its meaning to be hammered out by the FTC and the courts in the context of
actual cases.
123
The FTC, attempting to define its own policies and standards under the
act, soon clashed with the federal courts which, prior to Erie, looked to their
own common law of unfair competition to give meaning to the prohibitions of
the act.' 24 In FTC v. Gratz,125 the question was laid to rest by Justice
McReynolds, who stated: "The words 'unfair methods of competition' are
not defined by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the
116. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958). 4 CALLAIANN, UN-
FAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 1963 (2d ed. 1950).
117. Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
118. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466
(1941).
119. FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310 (1934).
120. Section 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(6) (1958)
provides:
The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partner-
ships, or corporations, except banks, common carriers subject to the Acts to
regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as
they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended, except
as provided in section 2 27(a) of Title 7, from using unfair methods of competi-
tion in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
121. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
122. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532 (1935).
123. Ibid. Also see cases collected at 533.
124. 4 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 116, at 1970. See also FTC v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475 (1923).
125. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
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courts, not the commission ultimately to determine as a matter of law what
they include.
126
Congress, thereafter, amended Section 5 by adding to the prohibitions of
the act "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in Commerce."'127 This amend-
ment served to free the FTC from the limitations imposed upon its construc-
tion of the act by the courts, 1 28 with the result that the range of practices en-
joined by the FTC now exceeds those which were prohibited by the common
law. 129
The intriguing question of whether a private party could seek a remedy
in a federal court for unfair competitive practices outlawed by the Federal
Trade Commission Act was academic for many years, since the federal courts,
prior to Erie, were able to provide adequate remedies under the federal com-
mon law of unfair competition. Thus, in 1929, there was no undue concern
when the Court, in FTC v. Klesner,130 held that Section 5 did not provide
private persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs. Although
there was some sentiment expressed in favor of providing a private remedy
in the federal courts under the Federal Trade Commission Act,'1' it was not
until after Erie, when the federal courts had to abandon their well-seasoned
decisional law of unfair competition and look to the state decisions, that the
question of a private remedy under the Federal Trade Commission Act be-
came a subject of more lively interest.
A persuasive argument that the act provides a private federal remedy
has been advanced by Professor Charles Bunn. 132 Although the FTC is
directed to enforce the act, he observes that its jurisdiction thereunder is not
made exclusive. The Klesner decision has, in his judgment, left unanswered
the question of whether a private party, whose cause of action is coupled
with a public interest, might seek a remedy in the federal courts. 33 Noting
that federal courts have applied the substantive rules of congressional enact-
ments to private actions not expressly authorized thereunder, Professor Bunn
concludes that the rationale of these cases is equally applicable to the Federal
Trade Commission Act, and that where Congress has declared certain acts
to be illegal, these legislative declarations are the ruling law."
4
126. Id. at 427.
127. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
128. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
129. 1 NiMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 32 (4th ed. 1947).
130. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
131. Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 261 (1936).
132. Bunn, The National Low of Unfair Competition, 62 HARV. L. REV. 987
(1949).
133. But see National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499
(D. Mass. 1942); Sampson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218
(D. Mass. 1949), aff'd per curiam 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
134. Bunn, supra note 133, at 994, where he cites the Safety Appliance Act, 27
Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. §§ 2, 5 (1958), the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577
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Despite general agreement that Erie created a critical need for a federal
law of unfair competition, 1 35 the argument that the Federal Trade Commission
Act provides a private federal remedy has not found judicial acceptance. Only
a few authors and scattered court opinions have noted the argument and
offered sympathetic comment on it.136 One such recent comment, however,
deserves the consideration of thoughtful lawyers. In 1964, just prior to Sears
and Contpco, Judge Henry J. Friendly of the Second Circuit, reviewing
Professor Bunn's "intriguing" thesis, observed that it has "considerable
appeal and deserves support from decisions in analogous situations."' 37 He
went on to suggest the desirability of removing any ambiguity in existing
federal enactments, such as the Federal Trade Commission Act or the Lan-
ham Act, by "trifling amendments" which would give full sway to federal
decisional law in the field of unfair competition.-3
8
Such amendments in the Federal Trade Commission Act would not
change the substantive law; they would simply provide another avenue of
redress for unlawful practices already prohibited by the act. 139 A party who
is aggrieved would be free to decide whether he wishes to pursue a private
remedy in the federal courts or file a complaint with the FTC. The FTC
would continue to act as before, upon its own motion or upon complaint, to
eliminate unlawful trade practices as required by the public interest.
The engrafting of such amendments upon a statute which in the opinion
of some legal scholars already embodies the essential provisions of a federal
law of unfair competition 140 would avoid the time, uncertainties and com-
(1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1946), and the National Labor Relations Act, 61
Stat. 136 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-158, 159-167 (1958). See also Federal Jurisdiction
in Suits for Damages under Statutes Not Affording Such Remedy, 48 COLUM. L. REV.
1090 (1948).
135. See note 78 supra.
136. See, e.g., Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77, 80 (2d
Cir. 1951); Radio Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack, Inc., 180 F.2d 200, 202 n.1 (7th Cir.
1950) ; Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the
Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1029, 1041 n.44 (1957).
137. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 87 (1964).
138. Id. at 88.
139. A precedent for providing private remedies in such legislation is already found
in the Clayton Act which, in addition to criminal and administrative remedies for illegal
business practices, provides a civil remedy for the violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
140. Bunn, supra note 133; Friendly, supra note 138. Of interest are the following
bills which have been introduced in the 89th Congress: H.R. 601, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) (Multer, N.Y.), to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to strengthen
independent competitive enterprise by providing for fair competitive acts, practices, and
methods of competition, and for other purposes; H.R. 4862, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)
(Rogers, Colo.), to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to define and limit the
term "unfair methods of competition in commerce" and "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce" and to provide that exclusive territorial franchises, under limited cir-
cumstances, shall not be deemed such method, act, or practice, nor a restraint of trade, and
for other purposes.
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plications of drafting and enacting comprehensive new legislation. This is an
appealing idea. However, it is not known whether the FTC would welcome
such amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act. Nor can it be known
to what extent existing administrative and judicial interpretations of the act
might limit its applicability and impair its effectiveness as a vehicle for over-
coming the effects of Erie and of Sears and Compco and for establishing a
law of unfair competition which would be adaptable to the needs of our
society. There is some reason, therefore, to question the advisability of an
approach to the problem of remedial legislation through amendments to the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
Lanham Act
Unlike the Federal Trade Commission Act, over which there has been
more apathy than controversy, the Lanham Act 141 has been the center of
continuous debate as to whether it has created a federal law of unfair com-
petition. The intent of Congress appears to be clearly expressed in Section
45 of the act:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control
of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use
of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such
commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to
protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competi-
tion; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of regis-
tered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties
and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair com-
petition entered into between the United States and foreign
nations.
142
Although it was believed at the time of its enactment that the Lanham
Act created a federal law of unfair competition, 143 the subsequent judicial
141. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1958).
142. 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
143. As early as 1937, Dr. Stephen P. Ladas, who played a major role in the formu-
lation of § 44, expressed this intention:
These provisions (proposed sections 44(b), (g), (h), (i) of the Lanham
Act) have the effect of placing tradenames and unfair competition under Federal
control when in commerce within the control of Congress. I submit that this could
be done directly insofar as interstate commerce is concerned, and it may be done
thus indirectly in a provision extending rights to foreigners and then securing the
same benefits to American citizens and residents as to foreigners.
Ladas, Trademarks and Foreign Trade, 38 TRADEMARK Rep. 278, 288 (1948). Also,
Edward S. Rogers succinctly stated the impact of the Lanham Act on the law of unfair
competition in his introduction to ROBERT, THE NEw TRADE-MARK MANUAL (1947):
... the binding force of the decisions of the courts of the various states with
respect to unfair competition and the obligation of the Federal Courts to apply
them, supposed to result from Erie Railway v. Tompkins, are now removed.
Id. at XIX. See also ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL (1947) at 177; Lunsford,
Unfair Competition: Scope of the Lanham Act, 13 U. PITT. L. REV. 533 (1952).
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history of the act shows that this purpose has never been completely and
satisfactorily realized. The bright promise of a uniform federal law of unfair
competition under this act has failed to materialize.
Section 44 of the Lanham Act provides that nationals of foreign coun-
tries which are parties to the conventions named therein shall be entitled to
protection against unfair competition.14 4 It further provides that citizens or
residents of the United States shall have the same benefits as afforded to
foreign nationals.' 45 That it was the intention of the framers of this section
to establish a substantive federal law of unfair competition seems clear ;146
and this is the position taken by the Ninth Circuit in Stauffer v. Exley.
1 47
Considering a complaint alleging unauthorized use of the Stauffer trade
name and other acts of unfair competition, the court determined that Section
44 had created a federal law of unfair competition and that the court could
formulate a federal remedy without regard to the local state law as would
otherwise be required by Erie.
14s
While the Ninth Circuit has remained steadfast in this rule, the Second,
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have rejected it. 49 One of
the arguments in support of the position taken by these courts is that Congress
would not have created a federal law of unfair competition by the circuitous
144. 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) and (h) (1958) provide:
Section 44(b). Any person whose country of origin is a party to any con-
vention or treaty relating to trade-marks, trade or commercial names, or the
repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is also a party, or
extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be
entitled to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to
the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or
reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is other-
wise entitled by this chapter.
Section 44(h). Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as
entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled
to effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided in
this chapter for infringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be
appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition.
145. 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(i) (1958) provide: "Section 44(i).
Citizens or residents of the United States shall have the same benefits as are granted by
this section to persons described in subsection (b) of this section."
146. See note 143 supra.
147. 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950).
148. Id. at 964-68.
149. Stauffer v. Exley has been followed in the Ninth Circuit: Pagliero v. Wallace
China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French
Labs., 207 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1953) ; but cf. Panaview Door & Window Co. v. Van Ness,
124 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Cal. 1954) which asserted that the court would prefer to follow
the position of the Second and Third Circuits rather than the Ninth Circuit.
The following circuits have rejected the Stauffer result: City Messenger of Holly-
wood, Inc. v. City Bonded Messenger Serv., Inc., 254 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 827 (1958) ; Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers' Educ. & Co-op. Union, 247 F.2d
809 (8th Cir. 1957); Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc. v. Pest-Guard Prods., Inc., 240 F.2d
814 (5th Cir. 1957) ; L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir.
1954) ; American Auto. Ass'n v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953) ; Allen v. Barr, 196 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1952).
1965]
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utilization of the international provisions of the Lanham Act, especially since
in Section 43(a), immediately preceding, it took direct action on the limited
issue of a federal law of unfair competition applicable to false advertising. 150
Moreover, why would Congress, only two years after passing the Lanham
Act, adopt Section 1338(b) 151 of the Judicial Code providing for federal
jurisdiction of claims for unfair competition which are substantially related
to a federal issue, if by Section 44 it had already enacted a federal law of
unfair competition ?152
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which initially did not offer as much
promise as Section 44, has fared somewhat better, but still without a satis-
factory result. 153 This section provides in part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection
with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods,
a false designation of origin, or any false description or representa-
tion, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe
or represent the same . . . shall be liable .... 1-4
In Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc.,155 relief was denied
under Section 4 3(a) to a plaintiff who claimed that the defendant mis-
represented itself to the public as being operated by or for the benefit of
labor unions. The court considered the scope of Section 43(a) in the follow-
ing language:
... it should be construed to include only such false descriptions or
representations as are of substantially the same economic nature as
those which involve infringement or other improper use of trade-
marks. It should not be interpreted so as to bring within its scope
any kind of undesirable business practice which involves deception,
when such practices are outside the field of trademark laws, and es-
pecially when such undesirable practices are already the subject of
other Congressional legislation, such as The Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.15
The section was more narrowly interpreted in Chamberlain v. Columbia
150. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 653 (3d Cir. 1954) ;
Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc. v. Pest-Guard Prods., Inc., 240 F.2d 814, 819 (5th Cir.
1957); Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 814, 881 (1955).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958) provides that "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with
a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark laws."
152. See Comment, The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 28 RoCKY MT. L. REV.
111, 122 (1955).
153. 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1958).
154. Ibid.
155. 87 F. Supp. 218, aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
156. 87 F. Supp. at 222.
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Pictures Corp.157 where it was held that there could be no recovery unless
the deception resulted in the sale of goods as those of the complainant. In
this case the trustees of the estate of Samuel Clemens tried unsuccessfully to
enjoin the defendant from using the name "Mark Twain" in advertising
which implied that the motion picture "Best Man Wins" was based on a
story written by Mark Twain.
The first encouraging judicial recognition of Section 43(a) was Dad's
Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc.158 Here the court declared that Sec-
tion 43(a) provided a new ground for federal jurisdiction in unfair com-
petition cases where the element of interstate commerce was present. 159 It
was not until L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 160 however, that
section 43(a) was successfully applied in affording a remedy for unfair com-
petition in a federal court based upon a federal substantive law. In this case
the defendant used a photograph of the plaintiff's dress to advertise a dress
of its own which was inferior in quality, different in style, and sold for about
one-third of the price of the plaintiff's dress. The action, brought under
Section 43(a), was dismissed in the lower court for lack of jurisdiction and
for failure to state a cause of action. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that Congress had defined a statutory civil wrong of false representation of
goods in commerce and had provided the right to relief in the federal courts.
16'
This same rule was recognized in the subsequent "Glass Wax" case1 62 which,
while denying recovery due to insufficient evidence, established. more specific
standards of proof than had been set forth in the L'Aiglon case.
Although these cases established Section 43(a) as a basis for substan-
tive federal relief, so few cases have been brought under this section since its
enactment that its scope has yet to be wholly clarified and its full potential
realized. Moreover, because of its limited applicability, it cannot be foreseen
that any increased utilization of this section as a result of Sears and Compco
will be of substantial benefit in helping to establish a federal law of unfair
competition in the absence of amending legislation.163
Despite the narrow judicial reading of its intention, Congress in the
Lanham Act was receptive to the need for uniform legislative relief. Recog-
157. 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
158. 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951).
159. Id. at 80 (dictum).
160. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
161. Id. at 651.
162. S. C. Johnson & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
163. Pattishall, U.S.A. Courts and the Prevention of Unfair Competition, 53 TRADE-
MARK REP. 599 (1963), Note, The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 47 VA. L. REV.
600, 625 (1961) ; Comment, The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, supra note 153,
at 114.
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nizing that the law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition,16 4 there is reason to hope that by appropriate amendments to
the existing law, in the manner suggested by Judge Friendly, 165 the Lanham
Act could be made to give the federal law full scope in this field and would
put the law of unfair competition on an equal constitutional footing with the
federal patent, trademark and copyright laws.
Lindsay Bill
Even as the Lanham Act was achieving judicial recognition as a limited
federal law of unfair competition, work commenced upon presentation of a
separate federal code of unfair competition. In 1947, a draft of such a federal
code was submitted to the Practising Law Institute. 16 From this draft, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York ultimately produced the
Lindsay Bill. This bill represents a culmination of the efforts of many dis-
tinguished and expert lawyers in the field of unfair competition.
1 67
Congressman John V. Lindsay sets forth the objects of the bill in these
terms:
The basic purpose of the bill is to create a Federal statutory cause
of action that could be invoked by an injured party as an alterna-
tive to the common law tort of unfair competition in cases where
interstate commerce is affected.' 6
The bill was introduced in 1959, 1961, 1962 and 1963.169 However, it
was not until the second session of the 88th Congress, in 1964, that Congress
held hearings on the bill ;170 and then the congressional subcommittee con-
sidering it failed to file a committee report with the result that no action was
taken on the bill prior to adjournment. On February 25, 1965, Congressman
Lindsay reintroduced the bill in the 89th Congress as H.R. 5514.
The Lindsay Bill would provide relief by way of injunction, recovery
164. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) ; United Drug Corp. v. Rectanus,
248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
165. Friendly, supra note 139.
166. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act, 38
TRADEMARK REP. 259, 271 (1948).
167. Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stiffel Case, 54 TRADEMARK REP.
731 (1964).
168. Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1964).
169. H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 4590, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961) ; S. 1036, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; H.R. 10038, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ;
S. 2784, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) ; H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; S. 1038,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
170. Hearings on H.R. 4651 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (June
16, 17, 1964).
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of court costs and, in the discretion of the court, attorneys' fees.' 17 It con-
tains no provision for damages, since it is believed that in most cases filed
under this bill there would be more interest in stopping an unfair practice
than in undertaking the difficult task of proving and collecting damages.' 7 2
Section 2(3) of the bill defines actionable conduct as "unfair commercial
activities" so as to avoid the problems of limited construction which have
attached to the term "unfair competition." Section 2(3) (A) provides relief
for any act which causes confusion as to affiliation, connection or association
of the defendant, confusion as to origin, source or sponsorship of the goods
or services of the defendant, and for the dilution of a trademark or trade
name. Section 2(3) (B) covers false or misleading statements as to the goods
or services. Section 2(3) (C), a deliberate catch-all, 173 makes actionable any
"practice which is likely to deceive or which violates reasonable standards of
commercial ethics," and is based upon similar provisions in two treaties to
which the United States is a signatory. 7 4 Section 2(3) (D) makes the in-
stitution of an action under the bill in bad faith an actionable wrong.
Under Section 3, the absence of competition, actual damage or public
interest has been eliminated as a defense, thereby insuring a broad, liberal
construction of the scope of relief afforded. Sections 4 and 5 create a defense
on behalf of innocent publishers and broadcasters.
Section 6 makes clear that the bill does not alter or affect the patent or
copyright laws. Exclusive original jurisdiction in the district courts of all
actions filed under the bill is provided in Section 1 (b), which amends Section
1338.of title 28, United States Code. Section 7, however, assures the states
of concurrent jurisdiction under their own laws of unfair competition.
The drafters of the bill have deliberately taken language from other
federal enactments whose terms have become uniformly understood, 1 5 and
they have avoided the use of other terms which have received a restrictive
interpretation.17
6
This bill, representing the distillation of years of hard and painstaking
effort, has produced reactions ranging from enthusiastic support to bitter
171. H.R. 5514, Section 1. Unlike H.R. 4651, which authorized court costs and
attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party," the new bill authorizes court costs and attorneys'
fees to the plaintiff only.
172. Hearings on H.R. 4651, supra note 171, at 32 (Statement by Sidney A.
Diamond).
173. Id. at 11 (Statement by Representative Lindsay). While the numbering of the
sections in H.R. 4651 differs from those in H.R. 5514, the two bills are essentially the same.
The testimony at the Hearings on H.R. 4651 therefore has equal application to the same
provisions contained in H.R. 5514 as renumbered.
174. Id. at 52 (Statement by Professor Derenberg).
175. Id. at 14 (Statement by Representative Lindsay).
176. Id. at 9.
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denunciation. 177 The American Bar Association, while approving such legis-
lation "in principle," has not endorsed the bill. 178 From other quarters come
doubt and strong objection. No federal executive department has approved
it.17 9 Instead it has been attacked for its vagueness, for its failure to give
definition to the term "unfair commercial activity," and for extending the
law beyond the bounds of the Federal Trade Commission Act.18 0 Although
the legislative history of the bill is not encouraging,, Sears and Compco could
provide the stimulus needed to bring the efforts of its sponsors into fruition.
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
The challenge to create a uniform state law of unfair competition, which
might harmonize and unify laws of the various states, has resulted in the
recent publication by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws of a draft of a Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.1 s1 The
177. See testimony recorded in Hearings on H.R. 4651, supra note 170; Note, Mis-
representation and the Lindsay Bill: A Stab at Uniformity in the Law of Unfair Competi-
tion, 70 YALE L.J. 406, 437 (1961) ; Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 1178, 1227 (1964) (Professor Brown).
178. 1963 S.P., A.B.A. Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law 59.
179. Hearings on H.R. 4651, supra note 170, at 3-8.
180. Id. at 5 (Statement by the Federal Trade Commission).
181. The conference undertook the task of drafting a Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act in 1959, acting at the suggestion of the Section of Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law of the American Bar Association. See Fuller, A Proposed Uniform State
Unfair Competition Act, 1961 S.P., A.B.A. Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Law 272. The A.B.A. approved the new draft law in August, 1964; but some doubt has
been thrown on this approval since at the time of the vote in the House of Delegates the
draft had not been referred to the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law for
committee action and recommendation.
This new law is but the latest of a long series of uniform laws, over two hundred
in number, which have been drafted by the Conference. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PAMPHLET 2 (1963-64). The Conference,
which is normally composed of three representatives from each of the fifty states and
from the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, was organized in 1892 to promote
uniformity in state laws on all subjects where uniformity was deemed desirable and
practicable. It was the outgrowth of the separate actions of the State of New York and
the American Bar Association, each of which had created committees to examine the
question of uniform state laws. The Commissioners, appointed by the governors of their
respective states, are chosen for their outstanding legal experience as lawyers, professors
and judges. Among their ranks have been such eminent members of the legal profession
as Woodrow Wilson, Louis D. Brandeis, Roscoe Pound, Samuel Williston, John H.
Wigmore, John W. Davis, James Barr Ames, and William Draper Lewis. See Francis,
1961 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 25 Ky. S.B.J. 201
(1961).
The record of achievement of the Conference attests to the vital role it has played
in the elimination of conflicts of state laws which have deterred the free flow of goods
and services between the states and restrained economic and social development. The
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the Warehouse Receipts Act have been adopted
by all 52 jurisdictions. 15 other acts have been adopted by 75% of the jurisdictions and
9 acts have been adopted by 50% of the jurisdictions. Another 54 uniform acts have been
adopted by a minority of the jurisdictions. See National Conference of Commissioners on
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scope of this act has been briefly categorized in a prefatory note stating that:
"The deceptive trade practices singled out by the Uniform Act can be
roughly subdivided in conduct involving either misleading trade identification
or false or deceptive advertising. '1 8 2
Section 1 of the act contains definitions of key words which are used in
a sense other than their ordinary dictionary meaning.
Section 2 enumerates the actions which constitute deceptive trade prac-
tices. Paragraphs 1-3 of subsection (a) define conduct involving "passing
off" and confusion as to source or association. Paragraphs 4-11 of subsection
(a) pertain to misrepresentations and deceptive advertising. Paragraph 12
of subsection (a) includes "any other conduct which similarly creates a
likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding." Subsection (b) of Section 2
eliminates the requirement of proving competition between parties or actual
confusion or misunderstanding. Subsection (c) provides that the act does not
pre-empt the field, but that other state remedies and the common law may
still form the basis for a state action.
The remedies in Section 3 include injunction, as well as attorneys' fees
and costs in appropriate cases. The endeavor of the Commissioners to con-
form the act to Sears and Compco is reflected in subsection (a) of Section 3
which limits the scope of relief in product simulation cases to the prevention
of confusion or misunderstanding as to source. Damages to injured parties
are not included in the relief provided, on the theory that the presence of a
damage remedy in the statute may serve to restrict the application of the
injunctive remedy. Subsection (c) of Section 3, however, would allow relief
by way of damages in a separate count on a ground available under some
other state law.
Section 4 sets forth the scope of the act, excluding from its purview acts
of a governmental agency, publishers or disseminators of printed or pictorial
matter who publish without knowledge of the deceptive character of the
material, and acts prior to adoption of the statute.
Apart from such considerations as the length of time it takes to have
uniform state laws adopted, the differences that creep into each state act, and
the variations that occur in state judicial interpretations, the major short-
coming of this act is its inability to come to grips effectively with the holding
of Sears and Cornpco that the operation of state law has been pre-empted in
certain areas of unfair competition. Moreover, until it is known more precisely
to what extent the field is pre-empted by these cases, state legislation
Uniform State Laws, Handbook and Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting in its
Seventy-Second Year 189 (1963).
182. Dole, Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: A Prefatory Note, 54 TRADE-
MARK REP. 435 (1964).
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presents many uncertainties. It would seem that these shortcomings and un-
certainties could best be resolved by federal legislation standing on equal
authority with other related federal enactments.
In connection with these legislative proposals, s 3 there is also sentiment
which favors the adoption of a nonexclusive federal enactment and a cor-
responding uniform state act containing parallel language.18 4 This would
incorporate the most desirable features of the Lindsay Bill and the Uniform
State Act providing effective remedies at both federal and local levels. Under
such a plan the state act would play a vital role at the state level, while
leaving to the federal law those areas of unfair competition where, due to
clashes with the patent, trademark, and copyright laws effective remedies
can only be provided by federal legislation.
CONCLUSION
That the law of unfair competition has survived and progressed with-
out legislative fiat is an eloquent tribute to the vital role it has played in the
operation of our free enterprise system. Experience has shown, however,
that if it is to continue to play this traditional role in the balancing of com-
petitive interests, the law of unfair competition must have the sanction of
federal legislation which will give it equal footing with the law of patents,
trademarks and copyrights. This seems clearly the lesson to be learned from
Sears and Comnpco.
An interesting footnote to this lesson is found in the International News
Service case, 1 5 where the court added the concept of misappropriation to the
183. Another legislative proposal, which at first glance is appealing, is the enact-
ment of a federal disclaimer by Congress to nullify the effects of Sears and Compco
and to restore to the states the regulatory powers in the field of unfair competition
exercised by them prior to these decisions. See, for example, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-14 (1958), disclaiming the intention of Congress to regulate the field of insurance.
This legislation resulted from the holding in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944) which held that the business of insurance was commerce and
therefore subject to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. However, if Congress enacted such
a disclaimer with respect to Sears and Compco there might still be a question as to the
extent of federal pre-emption. An interesting parallel with this suggestion is one made by
Professor Chafee twenty-five years ago relative to the enactment of a disclaimer with
respect to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. His conclusion is set forth in Chafee, Unfair Competi-
tion, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, in which he states:
Congress fight provide that the United States courts should follow their own
decisions in cases of Unfair Competition in interstate or foreign commerce. Such
a statute would restore the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson pro tanto. Although the
Tompkins case held it unconstitutional for the U.S. courts to make commercial law
in general, they might be given power by Congress to do so in cases of interstate
and foreign commerce. Aside from the difficulties of constitutionality, the difficul-
ties of draftsmanship make the suggested statute improbable.
Id. at 1301, n.30.
184. This proposal has been presented to the Unfair Competition Committee of the
American Patent Law Association.
185. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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traditional ground of misrepresentation as a basis for equitable relief against
"passing off." Finding the issue to be one of fraud, the Court looked to the
law of unfair competition rather than to the law of copyright; and it extended
the law to meet the need for equitable relief. Justice Brandeis, however, while
in sympathy with the holding of the Court, felt constrained to dissent from
the "judicial legislation" contained in the majority opinion. His prophetic
words are particularly apt today:
Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should pre-
cede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon any
property right in news or of the circumstances under which news
gathered by a private agency should be deemed affected with a public
interest. Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regula-
tions essential to full enjoyment of the rights conferred or to intro-
duce the machinery required for enforcement of such regulations.
Considerations such as these should lead us to decline to establish
a law in the effort to redress a newly disclosed wrong, although the
propriety of some remedy appears to be clear.'8 6
Although it is now generally accepted that federal legislation in the field
of unfair competition is required to clarify the law in the wake of Sears and
Compco, only future events will tell whether such legislation is in fact to
become a reality and, if so, whether it will come by way of minor amendments
to either the Federal Trade Commission Act or the Lanham Act or through
a comprehensive new law such as the Lindsay Bill.
The Lanham Act appears to offer the greatest possibility for the practical
realization of a federal law of unfair competition. The act is well suited to
amendments for this purpose, and it would seem that many of the problems
associated with securing passage of a comprehensive new law might be avoided
by seeking amendments to this existing legislation. As has been seen, the act
already encompasses that part of the field of unfair competition concerned
with trademarks and false advertising, and it provides an established basis
for private remedies in the federal courts. Through appropriate amendments,
the act could easily be extended to embrace the whole field of unfair com-
petition, thereby bringing into play the common law of unfair competition put
into limbo by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, and giving recognition to the equitable
remedies for unfair competition available in both federal and state courts prior
to Sears and Compco.
For these reasons, the Lanham Act amendments would seem to offer the
best first step to federal legislation. All of the legislative possibilities dis-
cussed in this article, however, have merit and are worthy of careful con-
sideration. Members of the legal fraternity who are interested in the law of
186. Id. at 267. (Emphasis added.)
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unfair competition can render useful service by thinking about these questions
and by working together to support those legislative efforts which offer
constructive and practical solutions. In this way the continuing role of the
law of unfair competition will be assured, and the legislative mandate of
Sears and Compco will be satisfied.
